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COMMENT: STRUCTURING AND
NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL
JOINT VENTURES:
ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE FROM A
LARGE LAW FIRM PRACTICE
Sanjiv K. Kapurt
First of all, I wanted to indicate my background will color
some of the remarks and some of the comments I make on
Rachelle Sampson's paper.' I primarily do work in the cross-
border transactional area. A lot of the work is in mergers and ac-
quisitions, and some of it is in joint ventures.
In trying to think about what Rachelle was saying in her paper
and whether I could draw from my own experience in this area,
last night I sat down and thought of the joint ventures I had been
involved in within the last six to eight years. I came up with a list
of twenty. Even though that certainly does not compare with the
hundreds of joint ventures that Rachelle looked at, it may give
some anecdotal evidence of the role corporate structure and gov-
ernance plays. Clearly, my limited experience does not provide
scientific evidence, but it may still be useful. Before talking about
my conclusions, I think that it would be useful to note a couple of
differences from the data that Rachelle looked at, and the data that
comes from my experience.
First of all, my data set is limited in the sense that I am look-
ing at joint ventures that came to a law firm, a large law firm as
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opposed to things that might have been handled by in-house coun-
sel. So, that may explain why some of my experiences were dif-
ferent from what Rachelle has seen. I suspect that a joint venture
has to be more complex and more monumental in scale before a
company requires resources from outside and incurs the cost and
retains an outside law firm to handle the matter.
The second thing that may contrast my experience from the
sample Rachelle was looking at, is the areas in which the joint ven-
tures were focused. Some of the ones that I focused upon were in
the research and development context. Most of them, however,
were joint ventures where some entity is trying to access a market
in °another country or access lower cost production in another
country. Intellectual property rights and R&D are a component,
but they are not the sole focus of the joint ventures.
As I was saying, I examined the joint ventures I had worked
on for the last six to eight years. I actually have two ongoing pro-
jects, but I did not include them within the sample I am going to
talk about today. Of the twenty joint ventures I have worked on in
the last six to eight years, all but two involved equity joint ven-
tures, which is very different from the experience that Rachelle
pointed out from her studies. Some or all of the differences in our
data sets I pointed to before will indicate that there may be reasons
why my observations are different from Rachelle's.
I should note that the joint ventures I am currently working on
might herald a new trend with respect to whether companies prefer
equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures. One of the joint
ventures that I am currently working on involves Brazil and the
other involves China. One probably will be an equity joint venture
and the other will most likely be a contractual joint venture, and so
perhaps a change in my prior experience with joint ventures in
terms of the percentage that are actually equity joint ventures is
being observed. But comments from practitioners in the prior
panel indicate that most joint ventures on which law firms have
worked on usually do involve equity joint ventures. I think there
are several reasons why that is so.
First of all, there is the issue of liability. A separate entity
provides a shield from liability. The most common entity used is
either a limited liability company or a corporation. People want to
have some sort of separate entity that can shield the operations of
the two or more joint venture partners from the liabilities of the
joint venture entity. Now, of course, as members of the prior panel
noted, there are fiduciary responsibilities that could arise with set-
ting up a new entity and could create more liabilities for the joint
[Vol. 53:937
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venture partners in certain contexts, but the overriding principle is
that a new entity will isolate the liabilities of the joint venture and
help the joint venture partners avoid assuming these liabilities.
The second reason to have an equity joint venture is one of
meeting local requirements. This is especially true in the interna-
tional context; one cannot just set up businesses abroad without
creating a new structure or a new entity. One actually has to in-
corporate or set up a limited liability company so that one can
qualify to do business, hire employees, and meet local legal and
tax requirements. Short of setting up a new entity, the only alter-
native is to qualify an existing foreign entity as operating a branch
in a new jurisdiction. That usually is much more complicated,
time consuming, and costly.
2
The third issue that is relevant is really more of a business is-
sue as opposed to a legal issue. A number of parties that set up a
joint venture specifically want to create a separate entity. They do
not want to have a contract where two partners can be adverse to
each other; rather they want to create a new culture. I can convey
what I mean by giving you an example. I have a German client
which is a huge, multinational, multibillion dollar company. They
have certain ways of doing business, but they are realizing that in
this changing world, with the advent of accelerating technology
and the Internet, their practices may not be ideal business prac-
tices. So, they want to create a separate entity where they can send
some people and expose them to a new culture and create a new
culture from which they can profit - without tainting the new ven-
ture with there "old culture" culture. This is just one example of
how business reasons lead to the creation of an equity joint ven-
ture.
Another business reason is to assemble a group of people who
are committed to this new joint venture. So, you put them into a
new entity. Ideally, they will identify with the interests of that
new entity as opposed to those of one of the partners.
An additional reason why you want to create a separate entity
is based on accounting and profit allocation issues. With a sepa-
rate vehicle, it is very easy for people to figure out how the profit
of the joint venture will be determined and who will get credit for
whatever sales or intellectual property that the joint venture cre-
ates.
2 Symposium, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 857
(2003).
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And the last reason is the one that was referred to by
Rachelle, which I think is an important one: that is complexity.
3
As you have to deal with the unknown in a complex situation, it is
much easier to just set up an entity, create a governance mecha-
nism, and let that entity go off on its own; whereas in the contrac-
tual case, you have to specify everything up front and try to deal
with all the possible contingencies. As deals become more com-
plex, you more often need a separate entity.
Now, obviously, when you undertake a transaction, as a law-
yer, one of the very first questions you ask is: Are we going to set
up a separate entity or are we going to do it contractually? It is
something that lawyers think about very carefully, but as I indi-
cated, my experience has been that you do very often go with a
separate entity.
If I look at the two joint ventures in which I was involved
with where a separate entity was not set up, it may also be helpful
to ask why was that? In one case, it actually relates to a question
that was posed to the prior panel about joint ventures in the non-
profit context. The joint venture involved a university and a re-
search institute. In that context, issues relating to shielding liabil-
ity, allocating profits, and other issues discussed above were not
that important, and so the decision was made to deal on a contrac-
tual basis, even though the joint venture was an international joint
venture.
In the other joint venture I worked on where a contractual
joint venture was used, it was just the structure of the deal itself
that lent itself to a contractual joint venture. In that context, our
client was trying to provide services in Mexico, but at the same
time was also trying to minimize taxation in Mexico. The way to
accomplish this goal was through contractual licensing arrange-
ments where an entity actually was not set up to conduct opera-
tions in Mexico. So there are reasons from a legal perspective why
one tries to avoid an equity structure.
Now, since I actually spent some time sorting out what my
experience in joint ventures has been, I thought I would share
some additional information about those transactions. That infor-
mation may not be altogether relevant to what we are talking about
in this panel, but the information might be helpful or might be in-
teresting in light of what was discussed in the prior panel and may
be discussed in the next panel.
3 Sampson, supra note 1, at 927.
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As I mentioned at the outset of my Comments, in the last six
to eight years, I have been involved in twenty joint ventures. Of
those twenty, five never came to fruition. That is, in a quarter of
the situations, the parties were unable to ultimately reach agree-
ment. They hired lawyers and they talked, but they did not actu-
ally set up a joint venture. What were the reasons why those five
potential transactions did not come to fruition? Two of the five
were in the context of acquisition transactions. Two parties were
getting together to buy a business and they were never able to buy
the business, and thus the joint venture never came to fruition.
In one unsuccessful situation, the joint venture was actually a
research and development joint venture involving the biotech in-
dustry. The parties traveled quite a ways down the path to setting
up their joint venture. All the agreements were drafted, and we
had started to negotiate their terms. But things came to a stop
when my client acquired a large business. All of a sudden when
the client acquired that large business, the client realized that there
were all sorts of intellectual property rights that were coming
along in that acquisition, and those rights might impact, and might
be impacted by, the joint venture that was being negotiated. So,
our client decided that it was not in a position to do the joint ven-
ture. It has been about a year now since that decision was made -
in fact I remember, on September 10, the day before the fateful
September 11, I was supposed to fly to Germany to discuss the
joint venture, and the client decided that it was going to put the
deal on hold. The deal has not been revived, yet it may. But, as
Jeanne Rickert pointed out in the prior panel,4 things change and
times change and whatever seems to be important or relevant to
the joint venture at one point in time no longer may be relevant in
light of other events that have occurred or are occurring.
In one of the other unsuccessful joint ventures, the joint ven-
ture did not come to fruition because of a disagreement on the
governance rights of the parties to the proposed joint venture. It
was to be a joint venture in Asia between a U.S. partner and an
Asian partner. They could not reach agreement as to who would
actually have control on different aspects of the joint venture. We
were in negotiations for six months, and finally the parties realized
that there was no deal to be had and to go their own ways.
The last one of my joint venture transactions that did not
come to fruition dealt with intellectual property rights. A U.S.
company and a Latin American company were going to combine
4 Jeanne M. Rickert, Keep Your Eyes Open: Avoiding Unintended Consequences in Joint
Venture Relationships, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897 (2003).
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their efforts from an intellectual property perspective and a mar-
keting perspective to sell some new products in Latin America.
My client, which was contributing the intellectual property, was
being asked to give some guarantees, basically, flat representations
that the technology being contributed did not infringe third party
technology - that is representations that were not qualified by our
client's knowledge. If one is a transactional lawyer, it is extremely
difficult to say that one's intellectual property does not infringe
anyone else's intellectual property. In order for the representation
to be reasonable and within the ambit of risk that one is willing to
take on, one has to limit a representation to that which is within a
party's knowledge. The other party in that transaction was unfor-
tunately represented by a trademark lawyer. With a trademark, it
is much easier to make a representation that a trademark does not
infringe third party rights and opposing counsel, who was a lawyer
specializing on trademark matters, insisted that a flat non-
infringement representation was very important with respect to
matters involving patents and technology. This was especially true
in the context where her client had been previously subject to trou-
bling intellectual property lawsuits in Brazil. So, we were at log-
gerheads in terms of assignment of risk on intellectual property
matters and negotiations terminated. It is interesting to note on the
flip side, the other party that was contributing its marketing abili-
ties to the joint venture was not willing to guarantee sales that
should be achieved from its marketing abilities.
So, those are the five examples of deals that did not go for-
ward. In each of them we were trying to create a new entity and
were not traveling down the route of a contractual joint venture.
Now, of the fifteen joint venture transactions that did go for-
ward, it is interesting to note that eight have already been unwound
in one way or another. Of the seven that remain alive, I suspect a
number of those will also unwind in the next few years with
changing circumstances. Again, as a matter of general interest in
terms of why they were unwound, I will relate the reasons for the
termination of the joint ventures.
The unraveling of one of them, in fact, just closed last week.
Basically both joint venture parties sold off their joint venture
stakes to a third party. In two of the eight cases, including in the
transaction that I referred to that closed last Friday, the unraveling
of the joint venture occurred because of disputes of the parties on
non-compete issues. The parties that were involved in the joint
venture - or at least one of the parties - decided that it wanted to
compete with the joint venture entity. That obviously raised issues
[Vol. 53:937
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES
for the other party and resulted in the termination of the joint ven-
ture. In one case, both parties to the joint venture sold off their
respective interests to a third party, and in the other case, one joint
venture entity bought out the interest of the other party to the joint
venture.
In a third of the eight cases, the joint venture unraveled be-
cause there was a change of control of a party to the joint venture.
The parties had entered into a joint venture to sell color cosmetics
using infomercials, and the joint venture was developing a whole
new product line. Ultimately, one of the parties to the joint ven-
ture was bought out by someone else, and the new party who
owned this joint venture partner decided that it did not have an in-
terest in pursuing the joint venture and wanted it terminated. The
other party was amenable to this result, and the parties simply'ter-
minated the joint venture. The parties had done a fair amount of
testing and research, including test marketing these color cosmet-
ics on television, but they ended up just terminating the joint ven-
ture and dissolving it.
In a fourth of the eight joint ventures that were terminated, the
joint venture was undone because of local legal regulations in the
country where the joint venture operated. In particular, the joint
venture was set up in China, and the Chinese government indicated
that the foreign U.S. entity could no longer participate in the ven-.
ture. The foreign U.S. entity partner thus ended up having to sell
its interest.
In a fifth instance of the eight joint ventures that were termi-
nated, the market targeted by the joint venture did not develop as
foreseen by the parties to the joint venture. The joint venture in-
volved the cotton industry. For those of you who are familiar with
the cotton industry, you probably know that the price of cotton has
plunged in recent years, and that affected the profitability of the
joint venture.
In a sixth instance of the eight joint ventures that were termi-
nated, the parties really did not work well with each other. They
of course, at the outset, thought they had a good fit together. The
partners were two smaller size companies in the cryogenic indus-
try. After a few years of working together, they simply agreed that
the joint venture was not working well, and they went their sepa-
rate ways.
In the last two instances of the eight situations where a joint
venture was ultimately terminated, one of the entities to the joint
venture ended up buying out the other party's interest in the joint
venture. In each case, one of the parties entered into the joint ven-
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ture because it wanted access to the market abroad served by the
joint venture. In essence, a party did not have the experience or
the resources to go abroad, and so it basically teamed up with an-
other party to enter the market abroad. Over time, the party fig-
ured out that it could better run the business separately than in the
context of the joint venture. Thus, it just bought out the interest of
the other party to the joint venture.
So, based on this overview of some of the issues that come up
in joint ventures, one key thing to keep in mind with joint ven-
tures, which was discussed thoroughly in the last panel discussion,
is that most joint ventures do unravel, usually because of the
change in circumstances and the change in needs of the parties to
the joint venture. 5 As a lawyer in private practice, one has to keep
this in mind., Thus, the termination provisions, the buy-out provi-
sions, the put-call provisions, the restrictions on transfer of joint
venture interests, the non-compete provisions - all of these, even
though they are contentious issues that people do not like to talk
about and think about when they are getting together to create a
joint venture - are key to the lawyering process with joint ven-
tures.
' See Symposium, supra note 2.
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